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The transitional societies of the former communist
world are important cases to consider if we wish to
understand the relationship between corruption
and liberalization. While these countries share a
distinctive institutional heritage, their patterns of
transition have diverged, falling into two broad
categories. On the one hand, there are the nations
of east and central Europe and the former Soviet
Union (FSU) where the transition to a market
economy has been accompanied by varying
degrees of political democratization; on the other
hand, nations such as China and Vietnam have
embarked upon economic liberalization within a
basically unchanged political framework of author-
itarian state-socialism. This basic difference is
likely to affect relationships between liberalization
and corruption. In the transitional societies of
Eastern Europe and the FSU, one can attempt to
assess the effects of both economic and political
change, whereas in the two Asian cases it is only
possible as yet to assess the impact of economic
reform. In the case of China, which is the focus of
this article, the issue of the relationship between
democratization and corruption enters not as a
current reality but as a future possibility However,
it is a society in which market reforms have been
fast and far-reaching and have been accompanied
by increasingly pervasive and large-scale corrup-
tion. As such, China is a potentially fruitful con-
text to explore the detailed dynamics of the
relationship between corruption and economic
liberalization.
I The Nature of 'Corruption'
All shades of opinion both in China and abroad
agree that politico-bureaucratic corruption, defined
simply in terms of the abuse of public office for pri-
vate gain, has increased during the era of post-Mao
economic reform in terms of the numbers of peo-
ple and layers of authority involved and the finan-
cial scale of abuse. Corruption emerged as a
political issue in the mid-1980s and played an
important role in fuelling the urban popular move-
ments which led to the Beijing Massacre of June 4,
1989. In spite of strenuous efforts to stem the tide
on the part of the post-Tiananmen leadership of the
Chinese Communist Party (CCP), moreover, the
rate of increase accelerated during the 1990s.
While the phenomenon is particularly rife among
officials in departments in charge of the domestic
economy and foreign economic relations, it has also
spread into the judicial, cultural, educational and
military spheres. Given the fact that the CCP is all-
pervasive throughout both government and econ-
omy, corruption in these varying institutions
reflects corruption within the party apparatus and
membership themselves. Corruption also extends
well beyond the politico-bureaucratic apparatus
proper, to include professionals such as doctors and
accountants and petty functionaries such as bank-
tellers, ticket-sellers and shop-assistants.
This overall trend can be identified both through
the official Chinese statistics on cases which have
been identified and prosecuted and through the
guesstimates of local and foreign observers (for
example, political and business risk analysts in
Hong Kong). By late 1993, for example, one of the
main officials in charge of countering corruption,
Deputy Procurator-General Lian Guoqing, admitted
that corruption 'is now worse than at any other
period since New China was founded in 1949. It
has spread into the Party, government administra-
tion and every part of society, including politics,
economy, ideology and culture'.' U.S. and Euro-
pean business people interviewed in Hong Kong in
1995 ranked China's 'business corruption perfor-
mance ' as Number 1 in Asia along with India and
Indonesia (with Japan and Singapore ranking the
lowest)
While there is agreement on these broad descrip-
tions of corruption in China, there is a great deal of
unclarity about what 'corruption' entails in practice.
While the notion of abuse of some form of institu-
tional power for private ends underlies all percep-
tions, the range of phenomena included varies
enormously This partly reflects the rapid pace of
socioeconomic change in China which is continu-
ally throwing up new forms of corruption and new
labels to describe' them. It also reflects the fact that
corruption embodies a wide range of activities lying
along a continuum which are distinguished by the
clarity of the norm-breaking and the personal self-
seeking involved. We can conveniently cut this
continuum into three categories of 'corrupt' practice
Uan was cited by Lincoln Kaye in the Far Eastern
Economic Review, 10 September 1993, p 16.
2 The Economist, May 20-27, 1995. 1 am grateful to
Robert Wade for supplying this reference.
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(A, B and C). At one extreme, Class A corruption,
are activities which are clearly illegal in formal
terms and involve a personal or group infringement
of institutional rules for individual greed. These
involve 'economic crimes' such as smuggling,
embezzlement of public funds, stealing state prop-
erty, large-scale bribery fraud and insider dealing
in emergent stock markets, which are dealt with by
legal means (including execution) for more serious
and administrative means for less serious cases.
Class B corruption involves the pervasive practice of
'state business' whereby individuals, political!
administrative agencies and local governments act,
often in highly entrepreneurial ways3, to seize
opportunities for their own benefit by exploiting
loopholes or contradictions in official regulations
and using their institutional power to exploit the
market potential of resources under their control.
Thus, for example, government departments and
state enterprises used the opportunities for arbi-
trage inherent in the 'two-track price policy' of the
late 1980s to purchase scarce materials and goods at
(low) official prices and sell them on at (high) mar-
ket prices. Similarly, in the early 1990s, local gov-
ernments and departments used their power to
enter the real estate market by selling land directly
under their control or using their powers to com-
mandeer (often scarce agricultural) land to establish
'development zones' to attract foreign capital in the
interests of themselves and their localities.
Throughout the reform period it has also been a
common practice for government departments to
establish satellite companies for their own institu-
tional purposes, partly to find places for personnel
declared supernumerary by official governmental
reforms, partly to build up the status of their
departments (for example, by building impressive
offices or houses for the workforce, or purchasing
luxury foreign cars for the senior officials), partly to
generate extra revenue to combat fiscal constraints
and ultimately to guarantee an 'exit option' for
senior officials who foresee a greater future in the
non-state sectors of the economy The beneficiaries
of these activities include individual officials (and
their friends and families), entire institutions and
local communities as a whole. Class C corruption
For analyses of the 'entrepreneurial state', see Blecher
1991 and White 1991.
reflects the influence of the pervasive networks of
personal ties (guanxi) which cut across institutional
boundaries and constitute an alternative pattern of
social relations in contrast to the politico-adminis-
trative and market realms. These personal relations
operate in ways similar to a 'gift economy' and give
rise to patterns of behaviour which are often
regarded as 'corrupt': preferential treatment for
friends and relatives, 'bending' formal rules and reg-
ulations to benefit individuals or small groups, and
conspicuous expenditures on gifts and entertain-
ment which are deemed necessary to create and
maintain guanxi.
These categories overlap to some extent and people
vary as to where they would draw the line in defin-
ing corruption across A, B and C. There is only a
clear consensus that Class A activity constitutes
'corruption': it is palpably illegal and is usually for
purely personal enrichment at institutional or pub-
lic expense. Class B is an ambiguous entity, how-
ever. While it may involve reprehensible or sharp
practices, these are not necessarily for purely per-
sonal gain - on the contrary, they are commonly on
behalf of institutions or localities and therefore
may provide broader social benefits. The common
element between A and B, however, is that each of
these practices involves a more or less clearly ille-
gitimate use of public power for individual or sec-
tional purposes, whether by the 'exchange of power
for money' (A) or 'power entering the market' (B).
As such, they can both be popularly construed as
'official profiteering' and included as forms of
'corrupt' behaviour.
Class C behaviour is a pervasive societal phenome-
non, however, and extends far beyond the realm of
official power abuse. For most people, it is a way of
making the system work in one's favour, of getting
round the myriad institutional and regulatory
obstacles to individual initiative. Thus popular per-
ceptions on the issue are highly ambiguous: while
people may excoriate high officials for allowing
their children to benefit from their parents' posi-
tion, they would riot hesitate to engage in such
practices themselves, albeit on a much smaller
scale. Thus the attacks on the corruption involved
in the dubious activities of the children of high offi-
cials can be seen less as a criticism of 'corruption'
and more as an expression of resentment at the
inequalities generated by the reforms and the fact
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that certain groups are far better placed to benefit
from the opportunities opened up. This is not a
phenomenon peculiar to China; as Gillespie and
Okruhlik remark (1991: 87), observers of corrup-
tion in many other countries have noted that 'the
administration and state-dependent entrepreneurial
groups benefit from corrupt activity only by the
exclusion of other groups from the spoils'. From
this perspective, it is not guanxi as such which are
regarded as illegitimate, but their use by powerful
groups (which may also include private business
people and foreign capitalists) to increase their priv-
ileges ahead of the rest.
Even if we were to accept the narrow Class A as our
working definition of corruption, the problem has
become increasingly serious during an unprece-
dented era of economic reform in which an incum-
bent Communist leadership has moved the
economy decisively away from central planning and
vastly expanded the range of market activity in
most sectors. As the extent of marketization has
increased, corruption has increased in tandem and
as the pace of marketization accelerated in the early
1990's, the incidence of corruption also mush-
roomed. H6w can we understand this relationship?
2 Corruption and Marketization:
Some Explanations
Numerous conflicting explanations exist to explain
the rise of corruption as an aspect of Chinese eco-
nomic reforms. Conservative members of the CCP
ruling elite see the problem as one of 'spiritual' cor-
ruption caused by 'unhealthy' capitalist practices
entering the country from abroad. Reformist CCP
leaders see corruption as an inevitable accompani-
ment of the transition from central planning to a
market economy, reflecting a 'half-way house' in
which market relations are developing, yet state
agencies still retain a great deal of power. As a
'socialist market economy' is gradually established
over the longer term, the problem of corruption will
decrease. More radical commentators, both inside
and outside the Party, go further and argue that,
while it is true to see corruption as an offshoot of
incomplete economic reform, its root cause is the
Leninist political system which still pervades the
economy and has not changed decisively during
the reform era. The only effective answer to cor-
ruption, therefore, is not merely a continuation of
the market reforms, but also political reforms in the
direction of greater pluralism, openness, freedom
and popular participation.4
The currently most popular analytical framework
used by the few Chinese academics who dare to
tackle the topic is that of 'rent-seeking', an approach
which fits most closely with the Chinese notion of
'exchanging power for money' (quanqian jiaoyi) (Hu
and Kang 1994). While this may be useful in
understanding much of Class A and B behaviour,
the theory of 'rent-seeking' has certain analytical
limitations in explaining the particular dynamics of
corruption in China for several reasons: (i) If cor-
ruption reflects the desire of public officials to
exploit their position for private benefit, why was it
not more widespread before the reforms when the
state's control over the society and economy was
much greater? (ii) Since all government officials are
potentially able to exploit their rents at any time,
how does one account for the facts that, even now
and within the same sector, some do and some
don't, that people in similar positions may create
and use rents in very different ways and that the
incidence and scale of corruption are increasing
when the ability of officials to assert direct control
over economic resources is waning? (iii) Since rent-
seeking theory tends to assume that the activity is a
negative force in social terms by reducing the over-
all efficiency of the economy, it may be difficult to
account for the fact that certain 'unorthodox' (Class
B) behaviour by public officials, institutions and
governments may bring clear corporate and public
benefits and may make a positive contribution to
economic development. Thus Smart (1993: 16)
argues that 'in certain circumstances the rents might
be socially desirable ... (In) a socialist society with
subordinate capitalist relations of production, rent-
seeking may serve to increase the efficiency of an
economy by serving to overcome obstacles imposed
by existing institutions'.
To capture the complexity of the dynamics of cor-
ruption in a post-socialist transitional society of the
Chinese type, one needs to spread the conceptual
net to include at least the following factors. First, it
is important to analyse changes in the institutional
For an example of this approach, see the proposal by
12 prominent dissidents submitted to the Standing
Committee of the National People's Congress in
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dynamics of the politico-bureaucratic system
itself under the impact of market reform. It is com-
monly acknowledged that there was less 'corrup-
tion' in the sense of abuse of public office for private
gain under the pre-reform Maoist system.
However, if the very notion of corruption depends
on a distinction between 'public' and 'private', then
it is largely irrelevant to a system in which the
'public' encompassed and virtually obliterated the
private. It is true that the Maoist system was per-
vaded by patron-client relations and there was a
system of unequal privileges based on political and
administrative power, but these were de facto insti-
tutionalized features of the system and, except in
extreme cases, would not qualify for the term 'cor-
ruption', particularly in the Class A sense of the
word. The latter was kept in check by a pervasive
system of institutional controls at the macro- and
micro- levels, organized and implemented by the
CCP apparatus.
This does not mean that pre-reform China was
largely free of corruption. Indeed, there had been
large-scale recurrent campaigns against corruption
up until the eve of the Cultural Revolution and the
Cultural Revolution itself in its early stages involved
an often violent mass movement against allegedly
corrupt officials. However, the Cultural Revolution
imposed such a high level of conformity on both
officials and populace and their insecurity increased
to such an extent that blatantly corrupt behaviour
was too dangerous to contemplate. By contrast, the
reform era has brought about a pervasive (and
partly unintentional) dispersion of power and con-
trol: from central to regional/local governments,
from governments at all levels to their departmental
components and from governmental agencies of all
kinds to increasingly assertive socioeconomic
groups (such as state enterprise managers and pri-
vate business people). This means that not only
has the range of institutional and local discretion
substantially increased within the political system,
but also the capacity of governments at all levels
to implement policies and enforce regulations -
including those designed to combat corruption -
has substantially diminished.
February 1995, reported in Lien Ho Pao, Hong Kong
and translated in BBC, Summary of World Broadcasts:
Far East (hereafter SWB:FE), 2241, 2 March 1995.
Second, Chinese observers stress the importance of
public values and personal morality. Indeed the
CCP organ People's Daily published an article
reminding readers of the Confucian principle that
'government officials should embody uprightness'
echoing the Leninist-Maoist emphasis on the need
for officials to have a 'correct workstyle and ideo-
logical standpoint'. In short, clean people make for
clean government and, even faced with temptations
arising from a defective regulatory environment, 'a
high quality person with honesty and self-discipline
may "repeatedly walk along the riverside without
wetting his shoes" '. But the concern about public
morality is not confined to the CCP leadership; it is
also widespread among the general population who
complain that the reforms have swamped the previ-
ous traditions of social solidarity and mutual
responsibility in a wave of 'money-making fever'.
Radical critics of the regime are also sensitive to the
issue, complaining of a 'value vacuum' and a 'col-
lapse of faith' which means that 'some people have
forgotten the most rudimentary sense of righteous-
ness essential to a society and of professional ethics'.7
In the decadent environment of the mid 1990s, it is
commonplace to hear people indulging in nostalgia
about the purer and cleaner days before the
reforms. In pre-reform society, even though the
convolutions of the Cultural Revolution had created
a great deal of cynicism about official standards of
public morality, an apparently large number of the
Party/government apparatus continued to adhere to
at least some of the principles of the official ideol-
ogy. As the reforms proceeded during the 1980s
and the official 'strategic task' of the CCP shifted
from political class struggle to economic modern-
ization, Maoist political morality became an increas-
ingly irrelevant attribute of public office. New-style
officials were to show their mettle by showing ini-
tiative and entrepreneurship in organizing eco-
nomic progress. Moreover, although attempts were
still made to socialize the bureaucratic elite in the
values of the old ideology, 'ideological and political
education' was not given high priority and had
diminishing effects.8 The depoliticization of the
Dong Yan, 'Government officials must be upright',
Renmin Ribao (People's Daily), Beijing, 2 August 1993,
in SWB:FE, 1769, 17 August 1993.
The words are those of those of CCP General Secretary,
Jiang Zemin, in a speech on 23 January 1995, reported
by NCNA, Beijing, 1 March 1995.
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elite has been accompanied by an even more
intense depoliticization of society Whether one is
speaking of Class A, B or C corruption, they spell
various ways of 'getting a piece of the action' in an
environment of increasing normative anomie in
which social motivations and relationships are
becoming rapidly commercialized but a new frame-
work of social morality has not yet arisen to replace
that of the ancien regime.
The third element which has changed in the reform
era is that the opportunities for corruption have
vastly increased. The gradual dismantling of the
previous system of directive planning, the increas-
ing commercialization of the public sector, and the
rise of vibrant new economic sectors such as small
collectives, household or self-employed businesses,
larger scale private firms and foreign-invested enter-
prises (notably joint ventures) have created a myr-
iad of opportunities for officials to use their still
substantial powers to benefit themselves and their
clientele. It is not merely economic reform but also
economic growth which has fuelled corruption
because it has rapidly expanded the incentives for
malfeasance and created a 'demonstration effect' by
opening up a widening gap between the nouveaux
riches in business and government employees on
fixed and relatively low salaries. Increasingly attrac-
tive opportunities are made even more tempting by
the regulatory vacuum or ambiguity which officials
face in exercising their powers. This latter reflects
in part the transitional 'half-way house' wherein the
previous set of rules for organizing governmental
and economic life have broken down but a new set
is not yet in place. In part it reflects the deeper
processes of political and administrative decentral-
ization. Not only do officials have more leeway to
exploit loopholes in the regulatory framework, but
they are more likely to avoid detection and retribu-
tion in doing so.
These increasing opportunities have been coupled
with an increasing demand for official malfeasance
on the part of newly rising economic forces who
find it necessary or advantageous to seek official
See footnote 4.
For a more detailed account of this 'ideological decay',
see White 1993, Chapter 5.
assistance to facilitate their business or gain com-
petitive advantage against their business rivals.
This is leading to an increasingly widespread and
quasi-institutionalized system of personal and orga-
nizational relationships between officials and busi-
ness people to their mutual benefit. In Chinese,
this is described as 'an exchange between people
with money but no power, and people with power
but no money'. This is not necessarily perceived as
an 'unhealthy' yet inevitable result of the transition
to a market economy, but rather as a potentially
long-term arrangement which can create a business
environment conducive to economic growth.
Analysts of this relationship have argued that it
should be perceived as a positive-sum relationship
of mutually beneficial inter-dependence which can
further economic development while at the same
time strengthening both the state and (more pow-
erful sections of) the emergent private sector. This
merger of elites has been remarked upon by
researchers working on the East Asian capitalist
NICs, notably South Korea (Suh 1989), and on the
Chinese urban economy, particularly in the more
dynamic coastal areas. For example, Solinger
(1992: 121) concludes that 'the essential economic
monolith of the old party-state now shapes official
and merchant alike; both have become dependent,
mutually interpenetrated semiclasses, even as both
share a new kind of dependence on the state'.
David Wank, on the basis of his fascinating study of
state-business relations in the east-coast commercial
city of Xiamen, concludes that 'the local state-soci-
ety symbiosis is difficult to conceive as a transitional
or corrupt phenomenon; rather it is based on pat-
terns of a mutually beneficial alliance that are the
sum of individual calculations of advantage' (1992:
21; see also Wank 1995). The relationships are
cemented by the morality and social conventions of
the guanxi relationship, based on personal trust and
reciprocity, the terrain of our Class C corruption.
But then one person 'trust' is another person's
'corruption'.
To summarize, Chinese market reforms have cre-
ated an environment in which an official has
greater freedom to abuse his or her position, has
more motivation to do so and less motivation not
to, has an expanding variety of channels and oppor-
tunities, and has many well-resourced people
willing to join the transaction on terms which offer
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security as well as material advantage. If we look
at the problem of corruption at the level of the
individual official or agency therefore, it is not sur-
prising that levels have increased steadily during
the reform era and have accelerated along with the
increasing pace of reform in the mid 1990s. During
this latter period, moreover, there are signs that
Chinese society has begun a new phase of structural
change, of which 'corruption' is but one manifesta-
tion. One can detect a profound process of class
transformation which, at its roots, embodies the
emergence of a new, post-communist bourgeoisie
through a dual process: on the one hand, a stratum
of economic influentials is rising in the 'private' sec-
tor aided by connections with state officials and for-
eign (mainly overseas Chinese) business and, on the
other hand, state officials are attempting to convert
their power into control over economic assets,
transforming political into economic capital.
This process can be seen as a response to the chang-
ing political context of the 1990s. There appears to
have been a rapidly growing recognition among
public functionaries that 'the writing is on the wall',
prompted by a number of events and trends: the
collapse of state socialism in Eastern Europe and the
FSU, the acceleration of the Chinese economic
reforms from early 1992 onwards and the increas-
ing pressure for governmental reforms (notably
involving the reduction of state personnel). These
changes created a growing perception that 'power is
something to be abused before it becomes useless'.
Class A corruption is a risky way of doing this,
whereas Class B activities offer a multitude of meth-
ods. These range from using bureaucratic privileges
to secure private houses on highly favourable terms,
thereby ending officials' dependence on their work-
unit for housing; setting up satellite companies to
generate capital or open up lucrative jobs; engaging
in real estate speculation through joint ventures
with domestic or foreign business or speculative
trading in the new stock markets; or gaining prior-
ity access to the initial share issues of state enter-
prises being put on a joint-stock basis. Some of
these ventures result in the establishment of new
and productive enterprises, but to a greater or lesser
extent they are financed by a drain of state assets
either for free or on a knockdown basis. One
report, based on a briefing from the head of the
National Administration of State Property, con-
cluded: 'If state assets are likened to a chest of
valuables, some people are opening big and small
holes in the bottom of the chest and the state assets
are running out quietly and unnoticed'.9 This
usurpation and exploitation of state assets was
particularly visible in the 'real estate fever' of the
early 1 990s when local departments and agencies
sold land leases to developers or invested in real
estate themselves, profiting from the concurrent rise
in land values. This was 'rent-seeking' in a literal
sense. Some Chinese observers describe this
process as one of 'primitive accumulation' and point
out that the officials involved in it - particularly the
older generation who have been working in and
for the state for a long time - have developed a
sense of proprietorship over state assets. They feel
that, since the assets are going to be alienated in
any case, they are the righteous inheritors because
they worked so long and suffered so much to create
them. This usurpation is thus not perceived as
'corrupt', but as a legitimate reward for a lifetime's
service.
From this broader perspective, the tide of corrup-
tion sweeping China in the mid 1990s is indeed a
phenomenon of transition, but not merely in the
sense of a transition in the economic system from
directive planning to a market economy, but also of
the creation of a new class of influentials created
through a merger of officialdom and business.
Optimists interviewed in China view this latter
transition as taking place over a relatively short
period (say 10-15 years), expecting the wave of
usurpation to reach a peak and then recede as a
truly 'private' business class forms and the state
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